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Abstract: Tunnelling and underground construction operations are often characterized by critical
safety issues mainly due to poor visibility and blind spots around large vehicles and equipment. This
can lead to collisions between vehicles or between vehicles and pedestrians or structural elements,
causing accidents and fatalities. To improve the OS&H conditions, it is important to investigate
the possible introduction of innovative techniques and technologies to reduce the occurrences and
consequences of shared spaces (spaces used by both vehicles and pedestrians). For this reason,
research was conducted to investigate the possible use of different technologies of anti-collision
systems in tunnelling operations. First, to achieve this goal, an extensive review of the literature
was carried out in accordance with the PRISMA statement to select the current techniques and
technologies used by general anti-collision systems in civil and mining construction sites. Then,
the operating principles, the relative advantages and disadvantages, combinations, and costs were
examined for each of these. Eight types of systems and many examples of applications of anti-
collision systems in underground environments were identified as a result of the analysis of the
literature. Generally, it was noted that the anti-collision techniques available have found limited
application in the excavation sites of underground civil works up to the present day, though the
improvement in terms of safety and efficiency would be considerable.
Keywords: tunnelling; safety; anti-collision systems
1. Introduction
1.1. Foreword
Tunnelling and underground construction operations are often characterized by the
presence of narrow and crowded operating areas (e.g., at the face), the simultaneous
presence of high-power, free-steering equipment, iterative work cycles, and constraints
in the time of completion of the sequences of the excavation phases. These problems can
increase the risk of interference between vehicle and pedestrian, impacting production
effectiveness and quality and giving rise to work-related accidents [1].
In particular, both underground and in the external yard, mucking, material and spare
parts transfer as well as crews marshalling from and to the face make use of free-steering
wheeled machines, track-based systems, or special belt conveyors for continuous mucking
operations. During the transportation phases, the aforesaid criticalities are increased, and
serious safety issues can result, mainly due to poor visibility and blind spots around large
vehicles and equipment [2].
To improve the OS&H conditions, special systems are used to overcome the limitations
in the operator’s field of view, such as visual systems covering blind spots, relayed to
monitors inside the driver’s cabin.
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Increased care is moreover devoted to improving the quality of lighting systems along
tunnels, reducing problems of glare and areas with very different lighting conditions, along
with the installation of acoustic signals or traffic lights along the route, etc.
In more general terms, prevention through design and total quality management of
the tunnelling activities [3,4], which also covers materials and personnel transportation,
can result in
• preliminary optimization of the system, consisting of track features (width and length,
development and grade, quality of road surface and tracks, etc.) and vehicles’ number,
size, payload, etc., including programs for accurate monitoring and maintenance of
the quality of road surface and tracks;
• feasibility analysis of the introduction of physical segregation of pedestrian and
vehicle areas through metal barriers or different levels, to eliminate or substantially
minimize the risk of interference, i.e., of overlapping of operating areas of the different
entities (workers and equipment) present on the construction site [5–7]. In practice,
however, the physical segregation, possible in some underground areas cannot yet be
generalized, in spite of the improvements in mechanization and automation of many
tunnelling phases, in particular at the face if D&B (drill and blast) excavation is used
(see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Walkways during tunnel construction with mechanized excavation—TBM (Tunnel Boring
Machine) (left). Face excavation with drill and blast method, which involves high concentration of
machinery (right).
In addition, the big difference between the various excavation techniques and the
large number of boundary parameters that must be considered makes it almost impossible
to provide general elements of comparison in terms of OS&H, and in particular in terms
of comparison between the different tunnel driving techniques as stated by Tender .L.,
et al. [8]. This confirms the need for a specific risk analysis [9] for every special tunnelling
situation, as the potential for vehicle and pedestrian collisions can vary depending on the
tunnelling techniques and technologies adopted.
1.2. Rationale
The st ti ti t e Department of Labour OSHA [10] on wo k-related accidents
(see Table 1) confirm that, in the category “Other He vy and Civil Engineering Construc-
tion”, whi h includes tun elling operations, ne of the main causes of accidents and f tali-
ti results from collisions between vehicles and vehicles/pedestrians or structural elements.
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Table 1. Causes of fatal injuries in “Other Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction” sector, occurring in the United States
from 2007 to 2018 (source: OSHA—Bureau of Labor statistics).























2018 21 - 6 - 4 - 5
2017 9 - 4 1 - - 3
2016 14 - 6 - 1 1 4
2015 15 - 10 - - - 4
2014 10 - 6 - - - -
2013 21 - 7 - 3 - 8
2012 11 - - - 7 - -
2011 11 - 7 - - - 3
2010 10 - - - - 4 3
2009 16 - 8 - - - 6
2008 9 - - - - 4 -
2007 12 - 5 - - - 6
1 NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) 23799 “Other Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction”: tunnel construction
activities are classified under this code. 2 According to BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) Occupational Injury and Illness Classification
System (OIICS). 3 Also includes cases in which pedestrians are struck by vehicles (e.g., by track or wheeled vehicles, such as wheel loaders,
trains, trucks) during normal functions, namely during transport, regardless of place. 4 Includes cases where there is contact between a
worker and a vehicle or mobile equipment, but not during normal transport (e.g., injuries caused by a part of a moving machine, such as
being hit by forklift as it is lifting an item, in this case subcategory “Struck by object or equipment”).
The chart from Figure 2, drawn from average percentages of the data in Table 1
showing fatal accidents per year for the reference sector, gives details of the incidence of
fatalities resulting from collisions between vehicles or between vehicles and pedestrians or
structural elements.
Figure 2. Annual average percentage of accidents by type of cause in the United States (calculated using data from Table 1)
in the “Other Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction” sector from 2007 to 2018.
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A significant number of fatalities in the heavy and civil engineering construction
sector (in which tunnel construction activities are included) appear to be caused in shared
spaces, that is, between free-steering and mobile equipment and pedestrians [11], as is also
confirmed by Safe Work Australia (see Table 2).
Table 2. Number of fatal accidents by cause (according to TOOCS—Type of Occurrence Classification
System of Australian Government) in “Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction” sector from 2014
to 2018 (combined) (source: Safe Work Australia).
Construction Subdivision and
Mechanism Number of Fatalities % of Fatalities
Heavy & civil engineering
construction 22
14% (of total number fatalities
in construction)
Struck by moving objects 1 9 41%
Vehicle collision 2 3 14%
Trapped between stationary and
moving objects 3 2 9%
Falls from a height 2 9%
Being struck by falling objects 2 9%
Other mechanisms 4 18%
Construction 5 years total 156 100%
1 Includes cases where pedestrians are struck by moving vehicles or mobile parts of machinery. 2 This code
is assigned to accidents that involve a vehicle (e.g., a tracked or wheeled vehicle) that crashes, overturns, or
goes out of control, where injury is the direct result of the accident and the vehicle has contributed significantly.
Collision also means impact against any obstacle on the road (e.g., holes, rocks, or other vehicles) but not against
pedestrians (listed under “being struck by moving objects”, as this concerns injuries to the occupants of the
vehicle. 3 This category includes events in which workers are caught or trapped between stationary and moving
objects, where the objects are part of the same machine or equipment.
While, with particular reference to tunnel excavation activities, and as a further
confirmation of the critical nature of shared space, the excavation of Alptransit tunnels
involved 15 fatalities from 2001 to 2005 (divided between the Lötschberg, Gotthard, and
Ceneri tunnels). Of these, eight were associated with transportation, four with equipment
and machinery, two with falling rocks, and one with an unspecified cause. Of the eight
transport accidents, three were caused by wheeled vehicles (loaders operating in reverse),
three by rail transport (derailment of a train carrying wagons filled with excavated material),
and two by vertical transport. This experience emphasizes the problem that most accidents
in tunnelling activities are related to traffic and transport [12].
Finally, the analysis of an accident that recently occurred in an exploratory tunnel
in the Northwestern Alps, carried out by means of the CCCP (Computer aided Cause
Consequence for Prevention) [13–15], confirmed the importance of the introduction of the
latest technologies as essential prevention measures (see Table 3).
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Table 3. Example of application of the Computer aided Cause Consequence for Prevention (CCCP) approach on a real
accident case in the reference context.
ACCIDENT CASE #1
ACTIVITY SECTOR: F42.13- Tunnel construction. NOTES: The victim was taking notes in front of the concrete block with his
back to the vehicle. As he was advancing, the machine operator did not see
the victim or the concrete block because the machine’s mast assembly created
poor visibility and a blind spot.CONSEQUENCE→ Pelvic fracture, genital injury
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It must be underlined that, even if the accidents database covers a limited number of
events, the sample shows that the problem is real and merits effort to control it, taking also
into account the small number of total underground operations inside the general sector of
construction and mobile activities covered by the 92/57 EEC Directive [16], and the linked
fatality investigation records in the statistical databases [10,17].
Moreover, the accidents due to interference involve significant costs because of the
ceasing of the tunnelling operations [18].
Hence, it becomes very important to investigate the possibility of introduction of
innovative techniques and technologies currently available to reduce the occurrences and
consequences of shared spaces, in accordance with the 92/57 EEC Directive. The Directive
highlights the importance of coordination of the organizational aspects to manage the risk
of interference.
To overcome these problems, research was conducted to provide useful practical
guidelines (investigating the possible use of different technologies of anti-collision systems
in tunneling operations) in a tunnel excavation [19].
Thus, the paper summarizes the initial results of the study, consisting of a thorough
review of the principal anti-collision systems available using different technologies. To-
gether with this overview, examples of application of these systems are also provided,
taken from the literature and from the direct experience of the authors, to illustrate the
considerable contribution that these systems make to the management of interference in
the project implementation phase (given that the use of integrated detection technologies
is not always enough to guarantee the absence of risks).
This paper focuses only on systems that can be used for operator-driven equipment;
self-guided equipment specially designed for tunnelling operations will be considered in a
future research phase.
2. Materials and Methods
An extensive review was carried out of the literature to investigate the current tech-
niques and technologies used by general anti-collision systems in civil and mining con-
struction sites. The literature search was performed in accordance with the PRISMA
statement [20] on the Google Scholar database. The search terms used included the fol-
lowing keywords: “collision avoidance system”, “proximity detection system”, “collision
warning system”, “underground activities” and “tunnel construction”. The search yielded
900 articles. Among the 900 references identified, 700 were excluded by title. Of the
remaining 200 articles, 132 were excluded because the abstracts were not relevant, 8 were
excluded because no full text could be retrieved, 5 because they were grey literature, such
as theses, congress proceedings and papers that had not received peer review, and 8 be-
cause they were not relevant. Finally, 47 documents were selected (Figure 3). Among the
documents selected, 32 concern underground mining environments, as these environments
have characteristics very similar to those relating to tunnelling activities, and 15 concern
tunnelling activities.
Each of the papers selected were searched for identification of the types of technologies
used, the operating principles, and the relative advantages and disadvantages/limitations
that may influence their effectiveness in tunnels for the construction of large infrastructural
works. In addition, the costs relating to the proposed technologies were taken into account
in comparative terms.
Furthermore, some possible advantageous combinations between different techniques
or technologies were also taken into account. These advantageous combinations over-
come any limitations that the different techniques or technologies may present in difficult
environments such as below ground.
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In the present study the vehicle speed represents an important parameter to be taken
into account (a procedure—worth adopting in the opinion of the authors—can be estab-
lished by using an automatic limiter, which prevents exceeding a specified speed in any
case, bearing in mind that even self-guided vehicles do not exceed this speed, and if no
limits are set, no anti-collision system can guarantee its effectiveness).
In addition, specific ranges of distance (varying depending on the types of systems
studied) were examined, enabling the braking or stopping of the vehicle in time to avoid
collision (bearing in mind the large inertia of vehicles, which makes it difficult to change
direction quickly).
Table 4 shows the range of distances allowed by the technologies covered by this
study, consistent with the speeds taken into account and the established goal.
Within these distance ranges, different progressive focus areas can be identified, which,
within the same distances, can be adjusted according to the needs of the context such as
to allow braking or stopping of the vehicles in time to avoid a possible collision between
vehicles or people/vehicles.
Finally, examples regarding the applicability and management of shared spaces with
these methods were obtained from the papers selected using the prism method and consult-
ing the websites of the manufacturers of anti-collision systems for underground activities.
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Table 4. Range of distances allowed by technology.
Technology Indicative Distance Range
Radar up to 30 m
RFID/RF (Radio Frequency IDentification) For low frequencies: from 10 to 30 mFor high frequencies: up to 100 m
Ultrasound up to 5–8 m
Laser/Lidar up to 50–80 m
Video cameras up to 100–150 m (in conditions of good lighting,variable according to the light conditions)
Thermal imager—IR (Infrared) up to 100 m
Bluetooth Low Energy beacon up to 10–20 m
GPS (Global Positioning System) up to 60 m
3. Results
3.1. Techniques and Technologies Used by Anti-Collision Systems
Eight types of systems were identified: radar, radio frequency (RFID/RF), ultrasound,
Bluetooth beacons, video cameras, thermal cameras/infrared rays, GPS, and laser. In
addition, two “basic” conditions are specified, which are (1) the constant attention on
the part of individuals working underground and of the vehicle operators, including
the checking of rear-view mirrors, especially when operating in reverse, and (2) leaky
feeders [21,22] (electrical cables designed to radiate), which represent an effective and
optimal communication system between vehicles and personnel along the entire tunnel
and between the underground environment and the surface to facilitate their location.
Table 5 shows the results of the literature review.
Table 5. Results of review of the literature.
Radar
Principles and Characteristics
There are two different types of radar: pulse radar and continuous wave (Doppler radar) [23,24].
Pulse radar technology systems work by measuring the electromagnetic signals’ flight time (pulses) to
determine the distance between radar unit and the object reflecting electromagnetic energy in the detection
area [23–25]. Doppler radar uses the Doppler effect to determine the speed (towards or away from radar) of a
detected object and its distance [24,26]. Single-beam radar is the most common for Proximity Detection
Systems (PDS). Scanning radar systems perform, according to their principle of operation, a scan of a single
beam to produce a two-dimensional (2D) or three-dimensional (3D) image [23].
The audible alarm is placed in the driver’s vehicle cab and is associated with a set of lights on the
dashboard [27].
Advantages
Radar-based collision avoidance systems are appealing due to their high durability and ease of use and
assembly [28]. Moreover, this technology has integration capabilities with multiple antennas [29].
It is proven that the attenuation of microwave and millimeter wave radar signals by dust, smoke, snow, rain,
and dense fog is negligible, so they offer good flow rate performance (better than lasers), even in adverse
environmental conditions. This makes radar a promising sensor for distance detection, even in low light
conditions such as underground spaces [23,25,26,30–35]. In addition, millimeter wave radar has a shorter
wavelength than microwaves, so the antenna for narrowing and transmitting the radar beam can be reduced
in size, which facilitates installation on the vehicle, as narrow beams make them suitable for closed areas
[33–35].
Both pulse and Doppler radar are compact and relatively easy to install, and Doppler radar can also measure
vehicle speed (in line with its operating principle, it detects a signal shift frequency generated from an object
within the detection zone) [23,34,36]. Generally, radar is effective for detecting people, other vehicles, large
rocks, and buildings [25].
Tests have shown that small metal objects worn by a person (e.g., glasses, jewelry, watches) do not affect the
size of the detection area. This is due to the metal elements reflecting the radar waves much better than other
materials, and this could cause differences in detection of the actual object distance. Generally, neither a
person’s height nor their body weight affects the width of the detection area, except for the close intervals at
which the test subject walks under the radar beam [27].
Radar systems can measure distance directly with lower requirements of calculation resources than other
systems [26,32,36] and they do not require workers to adopt wearable components [25].
Radar systems that can be used for Proximity Detection Systems operate at the microwave band frequency of
300MHz–40GHz, which is very different to the typical frequencies that can be found in underground
environments, so interference is unlikely [23,25].




Millimeter wave radar has a fairly small opening and a width beam narrow enough to allow scanning by
mirrors. These mirrors must be relatively large, making a scanning radar system bulky and potentially
problematic in underground environments [37].
The proximity of tunnel walls and other objects makes radar use in underground environments problematic
due to frequent false alarms [23,28,38–41].
False alarms may be due to the detection of objects that do not represent any danger (e.g., rocks, building
materials) [28,36] or due to loud noises or other unwanted object reflection, other than the target [33], causing
a sense of frustration in the driver and leading the driver to ignore them [28].
The factors influencing the operational capability are target distance, radar target cross-section, and the
medium through which the wave must propagate. Unit positioning with respect to the detected object is
highly dependent on the shape and orientation of the object. For example, more energy is returned to the
receiver if the radar is pointed perpendicularly at the side of a tractor trailer rather than at a cylindrical tanker
or a person [23,27].
High mounting positions require the radar to be angled downwards, reducing the length of the detection area.
This is dangerous because a person can walk near the machine without being detected, due to the short beam
width of the detection [27,28,42].
Special care needs to be taken to mount the sensor so as to avoid/reduce deposits able to form a thick layer,
such as dust, oil, mud, ice, or snow. Antennas should be mounted in such a way as to prevent water from
accumulating on the antenna or sensor [24]. Such deposits on the active sensor surface may affect its detection
function, so precautions should therefore be fitted [43].
The Doppler radar type cannot, because of its operating principle, detect stationary objects [24].
Radar technology does not provide identification of a human being per se, as it cannot distinguish people
from other objects, but only detects a presence [25,29,33,42,44]. It is not suitable for very fast motion scenarios
[29] and, moreover, constitutes a line of sight technology [25].
Radar requires higher energy consumption than other acoustic and optical sensors [26].
Some obstacles are not suitable for radar beam reflection, such as plastic, dry wood, or objects with large flat
surfaces that can reflect the signal away from the radar antenna [25,34]. A vehicle’s metal parts reflect much
better than human tissue, but the latter, in turn, reflects much better than non-conductive materials, such as
timber [41].
Failed recognition may occur when the reflected return wave is so weak that it cannot be detected by the
radar system [33]. With microwave radar, it has been shown that large antennas are required in underground
spaces, and this is impractical for surface machines [35].
Human exposure to electromagnetic fields generated by radar systems could lead to thermal effects, such as
tissue heating or, if too much time is spent near radar antennas, the causing of cataracts (but such effects are
not possible at environmental levels of the RF level fields generated by radar systems), or non-thermal effects,
such as alteration of calcium ions mobility. Currently, however, there is no evidence that adverse health




Most of these systems are already combined with GPS, V2V radio–lidar, recommended for high-speed driving
scenarios [26,43]. Another advantageous combination can be made between radar technologies and cameras
on heavy vehicles; as the radar is subject to frequent false alarms, it requires an additional method, such as
cameras, to verify the cause and exact location of a detected object, with the radar being used primarily for
the distance and calculation of the sectors of interest [26–29,32,46].
Technology costs
Radar-based collision avoidance systems have relatively low to medium costs, but are higher when compared
to acoustic ones [26,28,32,33]. Millimeter wave radars are priced higher than other types of radar [31,35],
while microwave radars have relatively low costs [35].
RFID/RF—Radio Frequency Identification
Principles and Characteristics
This is a technology used in several industries to monitor activities and safe applications [47]. RFID is a
generic term to indicate the use of radio waves to identify people and objects. RFID tags are included in
RF-based systems, and manufacturers use the tag in different ways. Therefore, it depends on the producer if
the system is classified as RFID or simply RF. A common RF-based system that is separate from RFID-based
systems is the magnetic field system, which uses low or very-low magnetic field frequencies to produce a
stable marking zone [23].
The most common identification method is to store a unique serial number, which identifies the object or
person (especially in a vehicle’s blind spots) on a microchip connected to an antenna, along with other
information, using wireless technology. The antenna enables the microchip to transmit the identification
information to a reader that can reconvert the RF signal into a serial number to use it [23,24,39,47,48]. Tags
with identification codes are worn by workers, and when they enter into a danger zone, they are detected by
the reader, so that an alarm alerts the vehicle operator by means of both an audible and visual alarm
[25,39,42,47,48]. These tags can be worn on belts or helmets or in the cap lamps of underground workers and
equipped with rechargeable batteries [47,48]. An RFID tag used for a Proximity Detection System contains an
additional circuit that allows it to determine the distance between tag and reader, measured on the basis of
the received signal strength (RSSI) [23,24,42].
Depending on the type of energy supply and mode of communication, the tags can be divided into passive,
semi-passive, and active. Passive ones are not self-powered and use the back-wave of the reader’s radio
waves, usually at the same frequency as emitted, to feed information. In semi-passive tags the energy to
power the chip is obtained from the battery, but the retro-diffusion is used for communication between tags
and reader. Active tags use battery power for communication and internal operations [24,25,42,49].
These devices have been adapted to underground activities, such as mining, in various ways, including
vehicle monitoring, personnel monitoring, inventory control, and maintenance interventions, for example
through the use of PEDs (Personal Emergency Devices), enabling them to be optimized with a consequent
reduction in cost, minimizing possible production losses [24].




Passive RFID systems are inexpensive and easy to install. The active ones allow a good range of detection of
up to about 100 m (in any case, greater than the passive ones) [24,25,30,36,39,42,43]. These systems can also
detect tags that are outside the line of sight (for example, around corners) [23,25].
The box that contains the reader and tags is robust, shows no reduction in performance, and requires very
little maintenance if properly designed [39,47,50,51].
Low-frequency RFID systems allow for close distances and also are resistant to large metal obstacles
[30,50,52], as low frequency signals can penetrate practically anything, including dust, coal, rocks, sprays,
metalliferous minerals, and metals. This obviously makes low frequencies the best choice in underground
environments [25,48,53].
Ultra-high frequency RFID systems allow long-range use and are reliable and cost-effective for both surface
and underground [30,52].
Tag-based RFID systems, operating at various frequencies, are popular for collision avoidance systems due to
their low number of false alarms [40–42,44,47,48,54] and can distinguish workers from other objects, thanks to
the unique tag identification code [27]. They have the ability to detect multiple tags simultaneously with high
efficiency, and the detection area is adjustable [36,39,47,48]. The availability of the system increases through
the use of multi-channel transmission [43]. The use of multiple tag readers allows an increase in area
coverage, accuracy in position estimation, and increased probability of “intruders” detection [42].
Such systems not only have the potential to warn workers close to dangerous machinery, but also to take
action in the operation of the vehicle, should there be a serious danger to workers [48,50,51].
Field tests have demonstrated the system’s capability to provide a reliable and uniform marking zone around
heavy vehicles [38,48,50,51]. The warning distance measurement results in RFID test systems having a good
margin for collision avoidance, within the range of about 100 m, allowed for by the high frequencies. Very
low magnetic frequencies, allowing for a range of up to 30 m, provide a lower margin for avoidance than high
frequencies [54].
Limitations
Installation considerations include reader placement, tag size, operating time (if self-powered), range,
material penetration properties, orientation sensitivity, performance near metal structures (radio reflecting
environments), susceptibility to interference (ducts and radiation), response times, multi-tag interaction,
multiple readability, and physical orientation of the worker [24].
Passive systems are generally short range [24,52] and do not give any information on the action range,
presenting a considerable sensitivity of orientation, as do the active systems. The latter require a battery in the
tag [24], while the passive ones need a specific system for the battery power source [29]. The system makes
use of sizeable equipment and is difficult to implement in hazardous areas [52].
The system using UHF frequencies suffers from a lack of accuracy in scope and is susceptible to metal or
dielectric blind spots [52]. This may be because high-frequency magnetic fields can be affected by large metal
objects [44,48–50,54]. Signal attenuation in UHF is increased in tunnel corners through diffraction and
dispersion due to wall roughness [49].
Every vehicle or all personnel must be equipped with tags to be detected by the system [39,43,48]. Possible
problems with this technology may include coverage issues [42]. No system provides the exact location of
personnel, but only what is near; this could be a problem in the case of a number of people close to the vehicle,
since is difficult to see who is really in danger [23,54].
Field tests have highlighted tag detection problems caused by changes in physical orientation (e.g., if a
worker bends down). The problem of directionality of tags can be reduced through a few directional antennas,
either for tags or readers or through a pair of orthogonal antennas, to improve field force uniformity in all
directions [47]. The height of the system antennas may influence the performance of the system [42].
Large electrically operated machinery can generate considerable amounts of electrical noise, so if the system
receiver works at the same frequency band as this noise, it may not distinguish the type of signal [48,50].
Other potential sources of interference are communication devices operating at the same frequency band
[23,50]. High-power electric systems, such as pumping stations and transformers, have been noted for their
interference with electromagnetic field-based systems; thus, as with RF, every electromagnetic field-based
system will suffer from possible interferences [23].
Advantageous combinations of
technologies
These systems can be combined with lidar or radar because radio frequencies identify the nearby personnel,
while radar/lidar provides accurate information on their position [23,43].
Technology costs
The technology using UHF electromagnetic frequencies has medium/low costs, including maintenance costs
[24,39,42,43], while low/very low magnetic frequency systems have medium/high costs [39].
The cost of some systems that represent an evolution of this technology, including the Hazardavert Proximity
Detection System, is much higher than the cost of other collision sensors, but the potential of the technology
justifies ongoing work to make this type of system much more reliable for all types of underground
operations, such as mining [40,47,48].




Ultrasonic sensors are used for a variety of distance measurement and proximity detection applications [23],
as demonstrated by successful use in the automotive market, where parking assist sensors, for example, are
very common [23,24,47].
These sensors use the speed of sound (by investing a target with ultrasonic energy) and the time between the
sound transmission and the return echo to determine the distance from an object [23–25,31]. Some of these
systems use separate sensors to transmit and receive; others combine both functions in a single sensor [24].
Advantages
They are compact, relatively easy to install [24,34,55], and have a low energy consumption [55], proving
themselves to be an inexpensive system with considerable accuracy, allowing an action range up to about 8 m
[29,43,52].
This technology has a minimum demand for infrastructure to be installed [29], with omni-directional sensors
providing good real-time detection [26] without requiring any wearable components from workers [25].
Ultrasonic sensors are not affected by lack or change in visibility [33].
These sensors can be used in an underground environment because data processing is simple, fast and not
affected by light, color or other objects (tests performed on locomotives underground) and uses separate
high-frequency receivers and transmitters [55].
Limitations
One problem is that the temperature, humidity, angle of incidence, and size of the target and the smoothness
of its surface affect the speed of sound and, consequently, the accuracy of the measured distances. The biggest
problem is that any object in the beam detection area or any external ultrasonic noise source (e.g., any
operating machinery nearby) can activate ultrasonic sensors, and thus an alarm [23,24,26,29,31,34,36,52,56].
There is the problem of attenuation of the signal sound energy decreasing with distance (due to the dispersion
of sound in the air) [34,35]. Ultrasonic systems may be excluded for use in restricted underground
environments as they generally have a low detection range and are susceptible to interference from the
ultrasonic noise generated by mining machines [23,29,35,36,38]. This prevents their extensive use on mobile
equipment to avoid collisions [35,43].
Ultrasonic systems are difficult to package in such a way that they are robust enough to withstand the
vibrations of mining equipment and the difficult environment of a typical underground mine, for example. In
addition, rather slow response times limit their usefulness in these environments [47].
This system requires regular preventive maintenance [52] (especially to avoid debris accumulation on the
surfaces of the external sensors [25]). Environmental factors such as rain, snow, fog, dust, and air humidity
can compromise detection functions (leading to false readings) [25,31,33–35,43].
Ultrasonic systems lack the ability to identify people; they can only detect the presence of an obstacle, without
distinguishing what it is [25,33,44], in part because only a low resolution is possible [55].
The ultrasonic sensor is designed for a single distance reading, which means that in order to acquire a clear
representation of the environment around the vehicle, a system that uses multiple sensors together is needed,
for example, to cover the width of a large vehicle [25,31]. Such sensors need to be positioned as close to the
target as possible to receive correct distance data, as sound energy is not optimally reflected. In addition, a
poor perpendicularity can limit the accuracy of the spatial position of an obstacle, in proportion also to its
distance from the sensor and the angle between the obstacle surface and the acoustic beam. If the angles
between the wave-front and the obstacle surface (normal to smooth) are too large, the surface may reflect
ultrasonic waves away from the sensor, and as a result, the obstacle is not detected or is seen as much smaller
than it actually is (because only a part of its total area is detected) [31,34].




As this technology lacks the ability to identify people, it can be combined with camera systems, allowing the
operator to check directly from the monitor in the cabin as to what kind of obstacle has been registered [27,44].
Technology costs Ultrasonic technology is inexpensive and also simple to use [26,31,33–35,55,56].
Lidar
Principles and Characteristics
Infrared laser sensors are used in many industrial activities, not only for proximity alerts, but also for position
determination [24]. These systems work in a similar way to radar, except that they work by measuring the
time of flight and the speed of the infrared rays emitted by the scanner, which bounce from objects along their
path [23,24,26,37]. Laser scanners usually use a single laser and receiver and sweep the beam using a rotating
mirror [23]. The mirror angular position during reflection produces the direction of the detected object. The
combination of these values forms the basis for a complete profile of the surrounding environment within the
radial scan beam of the laser scanner [26,37]. Once the echo reaches the photo receiver of the laser scanner, the
received intensity is transformed into a voltage. The types of echo reflections can be different according to the
material. Different detection thresholds allow the separation and classification of these echoes, as a single
pulse can generate different echoes. The measuring scanner collects the reflections of the laser pulse,
processes the information, classifies the pulse reflections, and transmits the data via an Ethernet interface. If
an object is detected within the predefined alarm zones (adjustable according to the vehicle speed), a visual
alarm (on the cab display) and an audible warning to the driver is generated [37].




Laser-based proximity systems provide accurate distance measurements of all objects within a scanning area
up to approximately 50 m [23,25,29,43,52,57]. Using lidar/laser-based systems, interferences are unlikely
since another laser/lidar source must hit the exact same point at the same time to interfere [23]. An
interesting feature is their quick and precise depth measurement and wide field of view, making these sensors
particularly suitable for covering the area right in front of the vehicle [58] and offering the possibility of
programming this area [52]. This system is insensitive to sunlight or the environment and has standard
internal filters for glare (this applies especially to scanning lasers); thus, it work even in low light conditions
[31–34,59]. Overcoming the problems of dust penetration and vibration has opened the door to the
introduction of advanced multi-echo laser scanning technology, suitable, for example, for the difficult
underground mining environment [37]. Field tests have proven that laser scanners (e.g., SICK AG Company)
are reliable in applications with adverse weather conditions and in dusty environments. Their capability has
been demonstrated on a range of mining equipment [37,60]. The state-of-the-art laser/lidar scanners capture
high resolution and 3D information and can successfully locate the target in different types of vehicles [26],
allowing a 360◦ view [61]. Pulse radar is safe for vision (Class 1) [31,58,60,61]; considering not all laser-based
systems are safe, it should be carefully assessed [34]. It also allows measurement errors to be minimized,
compared, for example, to a continuous beam laser [31]. Scanning lasers offer better results for detection data
with much fewer constraints and demand for computational resources than, for example, camera detection,
and the resolution is significantly better than that of ultrasonic sensors [31,57]. Laser/lidar systems do not
require any wearable components by workers (e.g., tags) [23,25,60].
Limitations
This system does not provide any information about what the object is, but only the presence of an object in a
certain position [23,25,29,33,42,44,61], and it is a line of sight technology [23,25]. Environmental factors that
affect accuracy and impair detection include temperature, humidity, dust, water splashes (heavy rain), snow,
and fog [24,31,33,35,52,55]. In order to avoid detection failure under these conditions, further hardware and
software processing is carried out, such as multi-echo, adjustment of detection threshold, filtering, and
internal classification of dust [43]. Deposition problems on the sensor surface affect its detection function
(precautions need to be installed) [35,43].In addition, the materials that make up the laser systems are often
unstable and have a short life span, resulting in reliability problems (and therefore requiring considerable
maintenance) [34]. Accuracy is also influenced by the target size and reflectivity, surface roughness, and
geometric orientations [24,35,41,61]. As a system suitable for short-range detection [29], the use of
underground laser/lidar sensors is complicated by the close proximity of the tunnel walls [38]. These assume
the demand for infrastructure and a higher energy consumption than other sensors [26,34]. Laser scanner
scans are planar, which means that if an obstacle is above or below the scanning plane it is not detected (this
may be a serious problem if a worker is not detected and is in the path of a vehicle) [23,31].
Advantageous combinations of
technologies
Some systems already include GPS and V2V radio. There is a possibility of combination with radar and
camera [27,44]. A combination of thermal camera/camera and laser/lidar can use the former to identify
pedestrians and the latter to determine a precise distance from the person and trace it even if moving
[23,26,32,59].
Technology costs
It is an expensive system and requires regular preventive maintenance [29,31,39,52,55]. 3D scanning lasers are
much more expensive than 2D lasers, given their complexity [26,31,32,57]. Typically, 1D and 2D lidar sensors
are less expensive and easier to package than radar [26].
Cameras
Principles and Characteristics
Cameras allow the vehicle operator to control a blind spot area in real time through a monitor in the driver’s
cab and are used in different industries [23,47]. Until recently, most camera-based systems were only driver
aids that did not provide active proximity detection, but thanks to the improvements in digital image
processing, this is changing [23]. They use optical sensors based on vision to track the approach of vehicles to
obstacles more effectively than active sensors, and in fact, thanks to visual info, they can provide a brief
description of the surrounding vehicles. Detection can be performed using stereo cameras as well as single or
multiple cameras. The cameras can be mounted either on the inside of the windscreen near the rear-view
mirror or on the rear of the vehicle. The use of both monocular and stereo-vision cameras typically manifests
itself in the use of monocular vision for detection and stereo vision for 3D tracking and tracing [26].
Advantages
The first advantage to note is the practical nature of the system [24,26]. It is well tolerated by machine
operators and can be complementary to many other technologies [52]. The system makes it possible to
distinguish workers from other objects (compared to detection solutions by radar, ultrasound, and radio
frequencies) and allows a detection range of various dimensions [29,33,62]. It enables high resolutions and
wide viewing angles and a large amount of information in the image, and it is independent of any
modification of the infrastructure in the context, given the accumulation of data in a non-intrusive way
[26,33]. Since cameras do not emit any signals, they do not suffer from any problems of interference with
stimulation from the surrounding environment [58]. The 3D cameras continuously scan areas around
machine blind spots and reconstruct 3D environments, identifying the type of obstacle, both fixed and
moving [62]. CCD (Charge Coupled Device) cameras can be used and have the main advantage of allowing
the detection of large amounts of information [55]. Various cameras can provide information rich in texture
and color (which is missing from other types of sensors, e.g., laser/lidar) [59].




Visible light cameras are commonly used for surface vehicles, but a system that uses visible light imaging to
function effectively in an underground mine would require its own light source, as otherwise the image
quality would suffer [23,26,29,31–33,42,47,54,57,62]. A further disadvantage of visible light imaging is that, if
a worker points light from helmet lamps directly at the camera, or when the camera is exposed to direct
sunlight, visibility problems may occur [23,32,43]. Video cameras are line of sight technologies and require a
high data processing effort [23,29].
The operator is obliged to observe the monitor continuously to see what is happening around the machine, so
if the driver does not see a person or an obstacle, the camera is not able to help [23]. The system requires high
maintenance and cleanliness and is susceptible to moisture and dust [29,47,52,54], as it may present deposit
problems on the sensor surface affecting its detection function (precautions need to be installed) [24,43]. Snow,
rain, dust, fog, and smoke result in visibility problems [26,29,31,33,38,43,54,62].
A disadvantage of stereo vision is the inability to adapt quickly changing light conditions (which the human
eye is instead able to do). Long calculation times are required to correct this defect, which would greatly slow
down the detection system [31]. In many cases, more cameras may be required to achieve a full 360◦ view of
the surrounding environment [26]. These systems require high computational resources to process images
(especially CCD cameras), particularly in the presence of backgrounds involving more complex environments
[26,32,33,55,57,58]. The accuracy of distance and velocity calculations is lower than for radar systems [33].
There are some objects that can give false alarms in detections, which are strongly linked to lighting
conditions and, generally, to image quality (cleaning of the detection head window, detection head angle and
height, proximity of the object, reflections, strong backlight, very low visibility, etc.). Objects that may cause
false readings include, for example, images of life-size people, bushes, gas cylinders, etc. [62].
Advantageous combinations of
technologies
The cameras are not used for the automation of underground operations, but as a complementary element, as
a passive aid, or for remote control, making it possible to verify whether what has been detected by other
systems is really an obstacle [43].
Technology costs
This is a low-cost technology [25,31,33,39,57,58]. In addition, the cost and size of the cameras continue to
decrease over time, making this obstacle detection method very popular [47].
Thermal Cameras/Infrared Rays (IR)—Machine Vision
Principles and Characteristics
Alternatives to visible light imaging are thermal cameras, which are available for various motor vehicles and
can produce crisp images in complete darkness [23]. Thermal cameras create images based on thermal
radiation (long-wave infrared) received from the target. The camera receives results from the thermal
radiation emitted by the objects in the scenario (for passive thermal sensors) as well as radiation from other
sources reflected by the objects (for active thermal sensors) [23,24].
The IR spectrum can be divided into four main areas: near IR (near visible light), short wavelength, medium
wavelength, and long IR wavelength. Near-infrared lighting is often used for night vision surveillance and
light-based distance sensors, such as time of flight (TOF) cameras and laser scanners. Long-wavelength IR (or
thermal IR) is the area of interest for proximity detection systems and is used for thermal imaging [41].
Infrared light is suitable for indoor activities because human-made objects usually tend to reflect infrared
energy well [34].
Advantages
Infrared cameras offer advantages that make them promising for use in underground environments; thermal
imaging does not require outdoor lighting, which gives it an advantage over imaging of systems with visible
light or near infrared [23,25,26,32,33,41,57].
Their applications in mining, for example, include collision prevention for vehicles and other mining
equipment [36]. A thermal camera could help the driver to see further and be able to react sooner, which
would be a considerable help in driving [23]. It shows exactly where a person is in relation to a vehicle by
allowing the system to alert the operator to a potential collision [63].
Both passive and active infrared sensors are good for long distances in fog, and active sensors can measure
vehicle speed [24]. The passive ones do not emit any electromagnetic energy and also do not interfere with
other underground systems [23].
Machine vision provides a way to detect people, defining how many and exactly where they are in relation to
the hazardous areas around the vehicle [31,41].
Infrared thermal imaging is not sensitive to blocking by dust. Thermal imaging illumination is radiated by
people, and the long wavelength (7–14 µm) allows it to penetrate mist, dust, and smoke [41]. An example of
this is the FLIR Systems Pathfinder thermal imaging camera [64].
The false positive rate is very low, but the detection rate is influenced by the complexity of scenarios with
groups of people. In terms of temporal performance, the system has proven to be efficient for frame
processing times; however, this depends on the number of pedestrians present [65].
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Table 5. Cont.
Thermal Cameras/Infrared Rays (IR)—Machine Vision
Limitations
Thermal cameras are line of sight technology and adopt intuitive methods for the operator to display the
source of an alarm. However, despite a good precision in determining whether a person is, for example, in the
path of a train or at long range, this technology is unable to determine whether the person is in a safe place or
not (since it cannot determine the target’s position with absolute precision) [23].
Passive infrared sensors can address precision problems in snow or rain conditions. For active sensors, the
environmental problems affecting accuracy can be temperature, humidity, dust, and water splashes [24,33,52].
Thermal imaging is less effective in very hot environments due to the smaller temperature difference between
pedestrians and the context. It loses its usefulness, especially outside, due to the inherent radiation emitted by
soil, roads, and artefacts or objects, in addition to pedestrians, themselves [34,57,65].
Infrared systems are liable to generate false alarms caused by direct sunlight, reflections, and very hot
environments [47]. Therefore, infrared sensitivity to environmental conditions, in particular direct solar
radiation, is a disadvantage [34].
Such systems require fairly high computational resources, as a result of the algorithms they exploit [32].
Advantageous combinations of
technologies
A combination of thermal camera and lidar or radar can use the thermal imager to identify pedestrians (since
it provides high angular resolutions) and lidar or radar to determine a precise distance from the person and
trace the target even if moving. Moreover, the combination of these systems may give less chance of false
alarms than the two systems individually [23].
Technology costs
It is an inexpensive technology, especially for passive sensors, and is easy to program, which makes it a good
candidate for being integrated with other technologies [32,52,57].
Bluetooth-Beacon-Based Underground Proximity Warning System
Principles and Characteristics
These are hardware transmitters, belonging to a class of energy-efficient Bluetooth devices, that transmit their
signal (with a unique identification code) to portable electronic devices nearby, which detect it thanks to an
app or a compatible operating system. Bluetooth wireless communication technology allows smartphones,
tablets, and other devices to perform actions when they are near to a Bluetooth device [54,66,67].
The system consists of the following main hardware components: signal transmitters, pedestrian receivers,
equipment operator’s receiver, and the software component that allows the reading function. Bluetooth data
exchange functionality is achieved through ultra-high-frequency radio waves at a relatively short wavelength
of around 2.4 GHz. Bluetooth technology is able to connect to multiple devices simultaneously in real time
through an ad hoc network. The signal strength is used to calculate the distance between the beacon and the
receiver [54].
The database stores the addresses of all Bluetooth beacons within the tunnel as well as the alarm images
corresponding to each beacon. The system receives signals from the Bluetooth beacons, which are installed on
workers’ helmets, on the rear of vehicles, and in potentially dangerous areas, and provides the driver with
progressive collision warning signals. When the vehicle approaches a worker or other hazard, the alarm
message appears on the display [68].
Advantages
Danger area beacons require only beacons in the identified danger areas; thus the demand for infrastructure is
limited [23].
Previous studies have confirmed that Bluetooth systems are an appropriate technology for the automatic
detection of human proximity in the workplace [67].
They do not require an external source of energy because they receive it from long-life batteries [54] [68]
Moreover, being devices with a low energy demand, they lend themselves very much to large
implementations of systems, with new functions thanks to the development of compatible software and
interface applications [67,68]. They are small, light, and easy to install everywhere and are made of resistant
materials and are not vulnerable to moisture, making them especially suitable for use in tunnels [54,68].
Tests on Bluetooth systems conducted in the field showed a low number of false alarms, and the measurement
results of the warning distance allowed a margin for collision avoidance. This is possible because danger area
beacons will give the alarm when people and machines are both within range of the beacon; since the area in
which the beacon is placed is identified as unsafe for personnel, the alarms are all considered true (this means
that false alarms are unlikely; however, they are not impossible, because in some cases the signal could travel
beyond the expected range) [23,54]. In addition, it has been found that the sound of the audible alarm was
clearly differentiated from other common equipment alarms and workplace noise. The user interface of the
mobile device is faster to calibrate than the devices of other proximity detection systems [54].
Limitations
Attenuation of radio waves by rock masses is a significant factor to consider for the development of such a
system, especially at excavation sites. The transmission characteristics of Bluetooth beacons may vary
depending on the orientation in which they are installed (although they can be designed to propagate
omnidirectionally). However, the tests performed do not guarantee the effectiveness for use in underground
environments because the conditions vary a great deal depending on the specific context and take into
account factors such as electromagnetic fields generated by the high number of electrical devices and
installations, high humidity percentage, salinity, and the presence of particulates, which may influence the
accuracy and reliability of such systems.
The transmission power of wearable devices is a parameter not adjustable on devices currently tested and
available on the market. This could be a limiting factor for proximity detection applications [68].
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Table 5. Cont.
Bluetooth-Beacon-Based Underground Proximity Warning System
Technology costs
The system costs are acceptable (including maintenance) for use in tunnels and safety management. The
equipment is not cumbersome, as it does not require the installation of a separate signal reception terminal,
since smartphones are used as receivers, and people tend to take these everywhere. The application of this
system can be shared as open source [68].
GPS (Global Positioning System)
Principles and Characteristics
GPS systems are commonly used for surface operations. This type of system requires all surface personnel
and vehicles to be equipped with a GPS receiver (which receives the satellite signal) as well as a radio for
communication with nearby vehicles. Each vehicle transmits its position to the other vehicles within a defined
area, and a display in the vehicle shows the real-time position of the nearby vehicles, personnel, and other
stationary objects [23,24,41,42]. The system alerts the operator if there is an obstacle within a specified
range [23].
Advantages
This is an excellent system for surface operations and can be used by a large number of people/vehicles
without affecting the quality of service, with good accuracy, and covering a large area [24]. It usually does not
have problems with the accumulation of material on the active sensors surface, nor does it have any problems
with dust, rain, snow, and fog [43].
It has hazard reporting functionality without the use of tags and may be complementary to other
technologies [52].
Limitations
The dependence of this system on satellite signals prevents its use in an underground environment deprived
of GPS. Therefore, any GPS-based system can be excluded for underground use, while it remains very valid
for surface work [23,24,29,41,42,52].
The reliability/availability of the system depends a great deal on the environment in which it is located
[42,43]; it is also not suitable for short-range detection [29].
Advantageous combinations of
technologies
The use of GPS and wireless networks to transmit the location of a vehicle to all other vehicles in the area is
necessary [40].
Technology costs
Collision avoidance systems using GPS-based technology have medium/low costs and require minimum
infrastructure for their operation [29,39].
3.2. The Contribution of Anti-Collision Systems to the Management of Shared Spaces: Examples
of Applications
In literature, there are many examples of applications of anti-collision systems in un-
derground environments. These practical examples are useful to understand these systems’
possible applications and effectiveness in terms of risk management and in avoiding possible
collisions between mobile vehicles and other vehicles, people, or underground structures.
Some of these examples are reported below (most of which deal with the testing of
detection systems on equipment used in underground mines). They are useful qualitative
feedback on the effective applicability of anti-collision systems and their usefulness in
managing shared spaces in the reference context.
In the construction of the Marào Tunnel in Portugal [2,69] and of the transalpine
Alptransit tunnels (such as the base tunnels of Loetschberg, Ceneri, and Gotthard) [12],
the contribution made by the application of video camera systems, especially rear-view
ones, connected to a screen in the vehicle cabin (from which the operator could have
better visibility of what was happening in the surrounding area) has been demonstrated.
The application of these systems, following fatal accidents caused by collisions during
construction work, resulted in a better risk approach by the operators, with a consequent
decrease in the risk of collisions in the tunnel (demonstrated by the fact that there were no
accidents associated with such a hazard from this time to completion of construction).
Anti-collision systems that have been designed and tested during underground opera-
tions and are available on the market are as follows:
• The HASARD system (developed by NIOSH), which is an active proximity detection
system that uses low-frequency magnetic fields and has been successfully tested on
mining equipment (for example continuous miners) in difficult environments such as
those underground. Several manufacturers have refined the technology proposed by
NIOSH researchers [25].
• The FEATureFACE project, which has been used to test the performance of indi-
vidual systems on equipment used underground, in order to create an innovative
anti-collision system that exploits the advantages of the combination of various tech-
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nologies (including radar, ultra-high-frequency RFID, sound-based localization, and
low-frequency magnetic field technology) to increase safety levels [30].
• StrataWorldwide’s HazardAVERT® Proximity Detection System, which is an example
of detection-based technology using low-magnetic radio frequency technologies that
are unaffected by environmental and climatic conditions as well as ultra-high frequen-
cies (UHFs). This is an evolution obtained through an adaptation of the HASARD
Proximity Detection System (originally developed by NIOSH), used in underground
coal mines. This system has been proven to be practical for underground applica-
tions, for mobile equipment, and with people on foot working nearby. It also can
be used in confined workspaces and with limited visibility, with people interacting
with numerous machines at the same time, and with people and/or vehicles hidden
behind corners, visual obstacles, and/or barriers of various types [48,50]. The system
provides multiple areas, ensuring a discrete distance range of up to 25 m [48,70].
• Becker Mining South Africa PTY Ltd. Collision Avoidance System, which is a hybrid
system that exploits multiple detection technologies, namely, electromagnetic fields for
short range detections and high and ultra-high frequency (UHF) detection to extend
the detection range. It is used for both underground and surface applications [25,52].
• Booyco Collision Warning System (for example Booyco CWS 800), which uses a com-
bination of very low (VLF) and ultra-high (UHF) radio frequencies, with a detection
range of up to 15 m. This system was applied in an underground copper mine in Zam-
bia, where it increased awareness and minimized accidents by alerting both machine
operators and workers on foot [71,72].
• Nautilus Coal-Buddy [73], which exploits magnetic fields and was used for miners in
underground mines.
• Minesic tunnel collision warning (manufactured by SICK), which is a powerful anti-
collision and driving assistance system in tunnels. It is suitable for use with most
underground mining vehicles. This robust system, based on modern laser scanners
and special sensors, provides safe maneuvering for vehicles in close proximity to tun-
nel walls, allowing the vehicle operator a better view of the surrounding environment
thanks to the in-cab monitor guide. It permits the detection of moving and static
obstacles, without the need for the use of RFID tags, with a low rate of false alarms
and a detection range of up to 50 m [43,61].
• FLIR thermal imaging cameras, such as PathFindIR (connected to a display in the
driver’s cab), which are not sensitive to dust and dark conditions and are suitable for
underground use [64].
• Bluetooth beacons, which were tested in [68] by installing the devices along the walls
of the tunnel, on the safety helmets of the workers on foot, and on the rear of vehicles.
In addition to the examples obtained from the literature, there is the experience of
some authors of the application of a system with radiofrequency tags (Figure 4), during the
construction of the base tunnel of the Lyon-Turin railway line (TELT site at Saint Martin La
Porte). In this case, every worker on the site wore a tag/badge (including vehicle operators),
and an audible/light alarm signal was placed in the operator’s cabin to warn the vehicle
operator of the presence of other workers walking in the proximity of the vehicle, from a
distance of about 3 m. The alarm in the cabin sounded even if the operator did not have a
valid authorization to proceed with the vehicle; when driving the vehicle, the driver had to
deactivate the tag; if the tag was not deactivated, the tag would be detected by the system
and trigger the warning alarm.
This system was used after an accident occurred during the construction of the tunnel,
which involved a pedestrian crushed by a vehicle. The application of the system has proven
to be very effective, helping to increase the level of safety and improve health conditions in
the tunnel construction works. In fact, no more accidents occurred.
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Figure 4. Application of radio-frequency tag-based system, with details of cabin alarm (top right)
and the tag/badge wearable by workers (bottom right).
Furthermore, infrared light anti-collision sensors (Figure 5), ultrasonic sensors (Figure 6),
and radar sensors (Figure 7) were used at the same site. These were applied to the wheeled
vehicles for the transport of the prefabricated segments that made up the final lining of the
tunnel. These systems showed considerable effectiveness, both in detecting the distance of
the vehicle from the tunnel walls (thus avoiding collisions with structural elements) and in
detecting workers on foot or other obstacles.
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4. Discussion
This study pointed out that RFID/RF—Radio Frequency Identification is the most
widely used and is often implemented with other technologies.
The less expensive technologies reporte i t e literature a pear to be ultrasonic
sensor-based systems and cameras, while lidar/laser systems are the most expensive and
re i i i te a ce.
In gen ral, the av il ble anti-collision sy tems are currently used for large obstacles;
howev r, in the fut re, it would be interesting to study suitable solutions to signal the
pres nce of fixed or mobile obstacles to i l resulting from exceptional
sit i . Therefore, it would be of considerable use if any obstacle could be equipped
with an emergency beacon. At the moment, the solution con i ts of a careful pos tioning of
the structural components.
If the accident case analyzed previously with the CCCP approach is evaluated using
the functional volumes method (distinguishing the protection volume from the physical
volume of the moving vehicle), it is possible to state that, by equipping the vehicle with anti-
collision systems, the operator’s reaction time can become sufficient to prevent accidents.
5. Limitations
The total comprehensiveness of the study cannot be guaranteed in such a vast and
evolving field, despite efforts to extend the bibliographic research.
Nevertheless, since the subject under study is extremely topical, sufficient comprehen-
siveness has been acquired to demonstrate the applicability of such systems in the context
considered, bearing in mind that there will certainly be further developments in the future.
6. Conclusions
From the systematic analysis of the literature, it is clear that anti-collision systems
have so far found limited application in the underground excavation sites of civil works.
However, the problem seems significant since, even with a limited sample, it is estimated
that in the working conditions (limited space, non-optimal lighting, unclear atmosphere,
and crowding of self-propelled vehicles of great power and considerable bulk), the risks
of interference between structures and pedestrians cannot be overlooked. The improve-
ment in terms of safety and efficiency that would potentially be made possible by the
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new automated anti-collision solutions would therefore be considerable, even though
the introduction of each new technology requires a careful predictive risk assessment in
terms of production efficiency, availability, and OS&H. A timely field check of the real
performance in the specific context must be then carried out.
A future research direction seems to be the use of these technologies simultaneously in
a combined system. Thus, if one technology fails, the other can guarantee the functioning
of the system.
The RFID/RF—Radio Frequency Identification, ultrasonic sensor-based systems, and
cameras appear to be suitable to be implemented in a combined system, because RFID/RF
is the most widely used and the other two are inexpensive and easy to implement.
This work will be improved thanks to the possibility of in-field testing of some of
the discussed devices, as part of the expected start of important tunnelling infrastructural
TELT projects in the alpine region of northwest Italy.
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